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Genius is a second commonplace; but to have uncovered, in human nature and in human tradition, some of the roots of poetic talent is surely an achievement. Another achievement lies in disclosing common factors in things which seem to be so widely separated as seem the normal consciousness, the dream, the mechanism of wit, the disorders of the hysterical, and the creative work of the poet. And the magnitude of the achievements is but little reduced when we realize that the discoveries and the explanations would scarcely have been possible had it not been for Aristotle, and Lombroso, and Charcot, and for contemporary psychology and bionomics. Both achievements lie, of course, behind the book. Rank's task has been to make, in a difficult and extensive field, a painstaking application of Freud's doctrine. The task might have been done more critically; but then it would very likely have lost in ardor. It is the work of the intelligent disciple.

The principles of psychoanalysis remain for discussion; but the appraisal of them lies outside the province of this review. One's admiration for the constructive talents of Freud, for his unusual clinical insight, and for his ability to conceive large problems and wide integrations, does not blind one to the difficulties of the "unconscious," to the limitations of purely logical constructions, and to the dangers of over-statement and exaggeration. The strength of the doctrine lies in part in its clinical and therapeutical usefulness and in part in its brilliant illumination of natural phenomena otherwise hidden in obscurity. For twenty years, psychoanalysis has grown in spite of bitter denunciation and unreasoning prejudice. Now it deserves candid and intelligent criticism.

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*The New Realism.* Comparative Studies in Philosophy. By E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, E. G. Spaulding. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1912. Pp. xii, 491.

This work has been hailed in various quarters as a notable book. To the frivolous minded the spectacle of six philosophers co-operating in the production of a book having a common fundamental doctrine and aim and thereby refuting the calumny that philosophers are constitutionally incapable of agreeing with each other, is mainly a brilliant exception that proves the rule: to others it is a significant formulation of the new movement known as realism, and as such is destined to mark a new epoch in philosophic thought. At all events the virility and extent of the movement are such as to give to this book a more than passing interest.

With regard to the standpoint defended in this volume, it is stated in the Introduction that "the new realism is, broadly speaking, a return to that naïve or natural realism which was the first of our three typical theories of the knowledge relation; and as such, it should be sharply distinguished from the dualistic or inferential realism of the Cartesians. But the cause of the abandonment of naïve realism in favor of the dualistic or picture theory was the apparently hopeless disagreement of the world as presented in immediate experience with the true or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. So the first and most urgent problem for the new realists is to amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it compatible with the facts of relativity." (p. 10.)

In pursuance of this end, the realistic authors attempt to dislodge epistemology from its bad eminence, to show that it is necessary and consistent to think of our environment as existing in entire independence of the consciousness to which it is revealed, and to eliminate the difficulties which are raised by the apparent discrepancies in our sensuous experiences. Throughout the whole of the book one single *motif* dominates the discussion, viz. that the relation of consciousness or experience to its objects is such that the experiencing of things involves no change whatsoever on the part of the things experienced. In this doctrine the writers are in fundamental agreement, and it is this doctrine which gives to the book so much coherence. The essay by Professor Marvin on *The Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology*, prepares the way by demolishing the traditional doctrine, according to which the constitution of the mind is a determining factor in experience. Then follows, *A Realistic Theory of Independence*, by Professor Perry, which discusses various meanings of independence and sets forth the meaning which is intended by the new realism. *A Defense of Analysis* by Professor Spaulding attempts an exposition of analysis which is intended to substantiate the standpoint of realism. The remaining essays are, *A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error*, by Professor Montague; *The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World*, by Professor Holt; and, *Some Realistic Implications of Biology*, by Professor Pitkin.

To attempt a discussion of each of these essays in turn would scarcely be appropriate within the limits of this review; and, moreover, this would involve the danger of making all the contributors responsible for views that may be peculiar to the writer that sets them forth. On the question of independence, however, the general agreement seems to be unmistakable; and this doctrine of independence is, in a sense, a summary of all that is presented. It is here that the dis-

tinctive and significant feature of the book must be sought. And, it may be added, that the conception of independence which seems to be intended by the six realists constitutes the natural point of attack for those who belong to a different philosophic household.

In making prominent the question of independence the writers are motivated chiefly by the desire to offer an alternative to the views which hold that consciousness in some way or other constitutes its own objects. To argue that in our everyday perception of things we are not dealing with the things directly, but with some mental replica or substitute is not only an offense to common sense but is also of dubious logical merit. The "man in the street" is essentially correct in his assumption that our intercourse with things is conducted without the aid of and such intermediaries. That things are occasionally perceived is, in a sense, purely accidental. Things undergo no change in being perceived; the relation which is involved in the act of perception is what the realist is wont to call an "external relation." Objects enter into the field of perception and pass out again, with no change whatever in their status as constituents of this universe, barring the fact that at one time they are perceived, while at another time they are not.

That present day philosophy is moving in the general direction indicated in the preceding paragraph can scarcely be doubted. In the form, however, in which the question is raised by realism there is involved an issue of fundamental importance. If we do not permit ourselves to explain the experiencing of things by resort to a psychical somewhat, called mental states, we are evidently obliged to assume that when we experience things, this event or act is something that happens to the things experienced. The things in question, it seems, undergo some sort of change. What sort of a change is this? To say with realism that the change is merely a change in the relations of the object, a change which leaves the character of the object wholly unaffected, is to leave the matter enveloped in a certain mystery. Our experience of things undoubtedly arises from the things themselves; it is an event or process in which the things experienced take a hand or have a share. The experience, even when construed as a certain type of relationship among things, does not drop down upon the things from out of a fourth dimension, but is produced by the things. In view of this fact, the insistence that the relations which constitute what we call our experiences of things are "external" seems to lose much of its force. To say that the experience springs from the things and is yet

wholly "external" to them looks very much like a contradiction.

To put the matter in a different way, the question at issue is whether the "independence" of things is a type of relationship which is discovered when we compare different experienced situations with each other, or, on the other hand, a relationship which may be affirmed of things independently of all experienced situations whatsoever. Are we obliged to maintain a thoroughgoing relativism, or is there an avenue of escape? Does independence have a meaning apart from such relative meaning as is involved in the comparison of different situations? The object presented in one situation may be independent of that situation in that it is able to figure in other situations as well, and in some sense as the identical object, but is it possible to give to independence any other intelligible meaning than this? The discussion of realistic analysis is not conclusive. It does not show that we can start with "independent" things and get experience out of them, but begs the question by taking things as presented in experiential situations and hence as already endowed with the very attribute or character which is to be explained.

We come upon essentially the same difficulty if we ask on what grounds the relation of experience is said to be external. It is evident that we are unable to compare the experienced with the unexperienced, in order to ascertain the nature of this relation, for the sufficient reason that merely to think of a thing is to bring it within the circle of experience. The comparing, therefore, is not between the experienced and the unexperienced, but lies wholly within the field of experience. To speak of a thing as existing independently of our momentary observation is not to follow it beyond the reach of experience, but is rather a shift in our experimental standpoint. "When me they fly, I am the wings." Since any assertion we may make involves an experiential standpoint of some sort, the assertion that experience is an external relation seems to be peculiarly lacking in foundation.

That things are in some sense independent of our experience of them is undoubtedly true. This fact is verified as completely as we can hope to verify anything. But this circumstance does not settle the question how this independence is to be interpreted. And it is precisely in its interpretation of this matter that the new realism seems to fall short. The book, however, offers much that is suggestive and stimulating, and it is unquestionably a book which must be taken into serious account by all who are interested in the development of present day philosophic thought.

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